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Copy 4 of 4

29 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

**SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Richard B. Russell -
29 November 1962**

1. The Director met with Senator Richard B. Russell, with John S. Warner, at 4:30 for approximately an hour. Senator Russell mentioned his visit to some of the [Redacted] and the Air Force monitoring station which he described as most modern.

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3. Senator Russell then discussed his trip to Luxor which at one point was cancelled but then was reinstituted in about an hour. There was supposed to be an Egyptian fighter unit there but when they arrived none of them were on the airfield. However, he mentioned the damaged Badger

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aircraft which looked like our B-47. He said this was shrouded in canvas and there were many mechanics working on it. He stated clearly it was damaged and he indicated a high degree of security was going on in the area with signs saying "no cameras." He mentioned the crew chief of the American military attache's plane who had been left there with the DC-3 which was forced to land due to loss of an engine. Russell described the difficulties in getting this crew chief out of the area back to Cairo. Later in Cairo, Russell stated the military attaches indicated they had picked up a rumor based on no evidence that the Badger aircraft had been shot down by mistake by Egyptian fighters. The Director said he would look into this. (An initial check with of OCI indicates that they had not heard of this situation.)

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4. The Senator asked the Director about the Cuban situation. The Director gave a rather detailed picture indicating we had counted 42 missiles coming out by aerial photography and visual observation from ships. Originally, based on the capabilities of the ships with large hatches, it was estimated there might be as many as 48 missiles in Cuba but our reconnaissance had only picked up 33. It was pointed out that the ships which turned back at the time of the quarantine were estimated to contain 35 missiles. As to whether or not there remain any missiles in Cuba, the Director commented on the difficulty of proving the negative. The Director mentioned the 42 IL-28s with apparent dismantling and only four left with wings and the movement of crates. He mentioned the 12 KOMAR PT-type boats, the four coastal defense sites with six missiles each. He mentioned the 39 MIG-21s equipped with Falcon-type missiles and piloted by Soviet pilots. While not having the altitude capability of a U-2, if they were in a good position possibly they could zoom and hit a U-2 with a missile. The Director mentioned the 24 SAM sites which are complete with the full communications net and radar. This is also manned by Soviets although on occasion Cubans have been on the net.

5. Russell asked if we knew how the U-2 was brought down. The Director replied that this was a SA-2 missile apparently during a test firing since there has been no more firing. An autopsy of Major Anderson's body revealed that the flak in the body entered on the basis of a burst above and to the left of the pilot.

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6. The Director indicated the FROG units were roughly equivalent to our Honest Johns. He described the four organized mobile armored units in battalion size. He stated he was very concerned about these and as to why they are there. Photo evidence reveals construction of permanent installations such as barracks, etc. The Director stated he could earlier rationalize the SAMS as a shield but why leave them there now. Also it was difficult for him to rationalize permanent installations for the armored units. He speculated possibly that they are there against the contingency of a take over after Castro had drunk some "bad coffee." The Director indicated there were some who believe the Soviets will let the situation in Cuba gradually drift downward but that he believes that Cuba is an extremely valuable piece of real estate and in fact more valuable to the Soviets than any one of the satellites as being a bastion for the Soviets in this hemisphere. Russell indicated his complete agreement with this view.

7. The Director stated that a massive intelligence effort is being conducted against Cuba with two U-2 flights per day scheduled.

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8. Mr. McCone commented on the press items charging poor intelligence in the Cuban crisis and Senator Russell indicated he did not think this was serious. Mr. McCone stated that he personally had pushed his concern about missiles in Cuba since last August. He mentioned that the President had commented to him today (29 November) that "no one would believe you or take you seriously." However, Mr. McCone added that while possibly we could have learned about them earlier, we would have had no positive proof any earlier. Russell commented that certainly it took more than two weeks to build these bases and Mr. McCone agreed that the photography of 5 September showed some trucks in one area and in retrospect this was the beginning of the construction of one of the sites. Consequently, it took approximately six weeks.

9. Mr. McCone commented on the insistence of the Soviets that the President come forward with his pledge against invasion. The DCI speculated that this would be extremely useful to the Soviets in the event of a take over and a threat by the U. S. to counter this which the Soviets


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could take to the UN and possibly win their point. Russell expressed his view that we should have gone into Cuba and cleaned it up once and for all but that maybe this is the best way.

10. The Director advised that the deal for the Cuban prisoners was off and that the money placed on deposit and letters of credit had been withdrawn. Mr. McCone stated he would advise in the future against any such arrangements, pointing out, however, that the Attorney General and Secretary Rusk just today have again raised the question of keeping negotiations open. Russell reiterated his very strong view against this arrangement but if it had to go the American people should be told the full story. He acknowledged, of course, the special responsibility of the U. S. for these prisoners and that the other 60,000 in prison in Cuba got there on their own. He was pleased that these arrangements were off. He pointed out that no other new Agency that he knew of after three years failed to get into trouble in connection with its appropriations. In the case of CIA, it continued to receive the money which it needed and was able to keep from public view the essential things which it required to do its job. If the prisoner deal were to go forward, he stated his belief this could cause the Agency serious trouble in the Congress on its appropriations. He likened it to dropping a big stone in a little mill pond and where the ripples stopped would be difficult to tell.

11. Mr. McCone touched on the Indian/Chinese matter mentioning



13. Senator Russell was very appreciative of the briefing session and I believe it served a very useful purpose.

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John S. Warner
JOHN S. WARNER
Legislative Counsel

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